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ABSTRACT.  
Innovation is the result of intentional decision-making that takes place in 
out-of-equilibrium conditions. The farther is profitability from the 
average and the deeper the out-of-equilibrium conditions. The farther 
away is the firm from equilibrium and the stronger the likelihood for 
innovation to take place. The hypothesis of a U-relationship between 
levels of profitability and innovative activity, as measured by the rates of 
increase of total factor productivity, is articulated and tested. The 
evidence of a large sample of 7000 Italian firms in the years 1996-2005 
confirms that a strong causal relation holds between the quadratic 
specification of profitability and the growth rates of total factor 
productivity. The results are robust to different approaches to evaluate 
productivity growth rates.  
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Technological change is usually treated either as the product of 
exogenous events, such as scientific breakthroughs or 
discoveries, or as the automatic and spontaneous outcome of 
learning. Consistently, much economics of innovation focuses 
mainly if not exclusively the analysis of the consequences of 
technological change. 
 
This paper elaborates the view that technological change is the 
endogenous result of intentional action. As such there is scope 
for a full-fledged economics of innovation, that is, the study not 
only of the consequences of innovation, but also of its 
determinants.  
 
Innovation is not only the cause of out-of-equilibrium 
conditions, but also the consequence of out-of-equilibrium. 
Firms innovate when out-of-equilibrium conditions prevail and, 
in so doing, keep away the system from equilibrium. On the 
opposite, when the system gravitates near-by equilibrium 
conditions, firms have lesser incentives and opportunities to 
introduce innovations: hence the system converges towards 
stable equilibrium conditions.  
 
The introduction of innovations is the result of a complex 
sequence of intentional decision-making. The decision to 
innovate, however, cannot be treated with the standard 
maximization procedures. The outcomes of innovations are hard 
to predict, and the actual chances of introduction of successful 
innovations are subject to radical uncertainty. The appreciation 
of the role of intentional decision-making in the generation of 
new knowledge and new technologies leads to the identification 
of the notion of creative reaction. The conditions for creative 
reaction are provided by the mix of incentives and opportunities 
that emerge when firms are found in out-of-equilibrium 
conditions. More specifically, we contend that out-of-
equilibrium conditions are identified by levels of profitability 
below and above the average: in both cases the firm and the   3
system are not in equilibrium. Firms innovate when either 
change is induced by emerging failures and generally by the 
mismatch between expectations and actual market conditions, or 
by emerging opportunities that take place in well-identified 
institutional conditions. 
 
Consistently with the dominant view that technological change 
is exogenous a large literature has explored the relationship 
between innovation and profitability where the attention focuses 
upon the consequences of innovation upon profits. Much less 
attention has been paid to the reverse causal relationship2. This 
paper explores the role of profitability as a determinant of 
innovative activity.  
 
A consistent and coherent frame of analysis can be elaborated 
by integrating different and yet complementary strands of 
literature that share the view that technological change is 
endogenous and that the decision to innovate is an intentional 
and relevant component of economic decision-making.  
 
Specifically, the new appreciation of some neglected facets of 
three such approaches provides complementary components for 
an integrated economics of the role of profitability as a causal 
factor of innovative activities: a) the reappraisal of the Marxian 
analysis of the role of the decline in profitability in pushing 
firms to innovate, b) the reconsideration of the Schumpeterian 
analysis of the extra-profits associated with the corporation as 
an institutional engine for continual introduction of innovations 
and c) the implications of the behavioral theory of failure-
induced decision-making. Building upon such elements the 
paper elaborates and tests empirically the hypothesis that a non-
linear relationship between profits and innovation is at work.  
                                                 
2 Since the seminal contributions of Schmoockler (1966) and Scherer (1982) few 
studies have addressed the role of demand in pushing technological change. Here, 
however, here we take a different perspective, focusing on the dynamics of 
profitability as a key determinants of innovation (Saviotti, 2001; Crespi and Pianta, 
2007).     
   4
 
The rest of the paper is organized as it follows. Section 2 
collects the different building blocks of the analysis of the 
causal relations between profitability and innovation is 
addressed. Section 3 provides an integrated framework and puts 
forward the working hypotheses. Section 4 presents the model, 
provides information on the data and tests the hypotheses. The 
conclusions summarize the theoretical and empirical results of 
the paper. 
 
2. THE BUILDING BLOCKS 
2.1. THE MARXIAN LEGACIES 
According to a well-established tradition of analysis, Marx 
contributed the first elements of the theory of induced 
technological change. The introduction of new capital-intensive 
technologies is the result of the intentional process of 
augmented labour substitution. When wages increase, capitalists 
are induced to introduce new technologies that are embodied in 
capital goods. Hence technological change is introduced with 
the twin aim of substituting capital to labor so as to reduce the 
pressure of unions and increasing the total efficiency of the 
production process (Marx, 1867).  
 
John Hicks (1932) and Fellner (1961) extracted from the 
analysis of Karl Marx the basic elements of the theory of the 
induced technological change: firms are induced to change their 
technology when wages increase. Technological change is 
considered an augmented form of substitution: technological 
change complements technical change. Binswanger and Ruttan 
(1978) eventually articulated a more general theory of induced 
technological change: firms introduce new technologies in order 
to save on the production factors that are relatively more 
expensive. Such production factors can be labor, as much as 
energy or even capital in specific circumstances. The induced 
technological change approach has been criticized by Salter 
(1966) according to whom firms should be equally eager to 
introduce any kind of technological change, either labour- or   5
capital-intensive, provided it enables the reduction of production 
costs and the increase of efficiency.  
 
An important facet of the Marxian analysis is missing in the 
induced technological change approach. The analysis of the 
Marxian contribution by Rosenberg (1976)  highlights the 
limitations of the induced technological change approach and 
helps to understand the key role of profitability. Firms try and 
contrast the decline in their profitability, stemming from the 
increase in wages, with the introduction of technological 
innovations. Starting from a common reference to Marx, Hicks 
paved the way to a tradition of analysis that focuses the role of 
the changes in the prices of production factors in inducing 
technological innovations, Rosenberg, instead, stresses the role 
of the decline in profitability as the focusing mechanism that 
pushes firm to undertake innovative activities. According to 
Rosenberg firms innovate in order to restore the levels of 
profitability (that have been undermined by the raise in wages). 
According to Hicks firms react to the increase in wages (and the 
related decline in profitability). As Nathan Rosenberg (1969) 
argues Marx provides elements to build much a broader 
inducement hypothesis, one where the levels of profitability are 
a cause of endogenous technological change. This line of 
analysis has received much less attention in the economics of 
innovation, and yet it provides a clear replay to Salter’s 
arguments 
 
2.2. THE SCHUMPETERIAN LEGACIES 
 
Business cycles and innovation cycles 
 
The Rosenberg-Marx line of analysis is fully consistent with the 
appreciation of the role of creative reaction in economic history, 
elaborated by Schumpeter in Business Cycles (1939). Here 
Schumpeter suggests that the gales of innovations peak in the 
periods of decline of the rates of profitability and growth. After 
a sustained phase of expansion, the decline in the opportunities   6
for further growth of output and profits induces firms to 
innovate. Hence the business cycle and the innovation cycle are 
specular. In periods of expansion the rates of introduction of 
innovations decline. When profitability and growth are high, 
firms exploit and refine the technological innovations 
introduced in the periods of crisis. Technological change is 
characterized by the introduction of minor and incremental 
innovations. On the opposite, major breakthroughs take place 
when the search for new technologies acquires a strong 
collective character. When the rates of growth are lower, and the 
profitability declines, in fact, many firms try and react by means 
of the systematic search for new ideas. The generalized decline 
in profitability and the complementarity among individual 
search activities stemming from the intrinsic indivisibility of 
knowledge and favors the emergence of collective knowledge 
pools and hence the chances of introduction of radical 
innovations. The causal relationship between profitability and 
innovation acquires in Business Cycle an aggregate dimension.  
 
Firm size and innovation incentives 
 
In Capitalism socialism and democracy Schumpeter identifies 
the large corporation as the driving institution for the 
introduction of innovations. The corporation is itself an 
institutional innovation that favors the introduction of 
technological innovations for many reasons. As a large literature 
has stressed, the corporation can use the barriers to entry as a 
barrier to imitation. The risks of uncontrolled leakage of 
proprietary knowledge in fact are reduced when the innovator 
enjoys the benefits of economies of scale and absolute cost 
advantages so that new competitors might imitate but cannot 
actually enter the market place. Cutthroat competition risks to 
reduce the incentives to introduce technologies for the intrinsic 
non-appropriability of knowledge and the high risks of imitation 
and entry of new competitors that can take advantage of 
opportunistic behavior. Some intermediary levels of workable 
competition, comprised between the extremes of monopoly and   7
perfect competition, among large firms might favor the rate of 
introduction of innovations. Oligopolistic market structures and 
the large size of firms are viewed as positive factors able to 
sustain the rates of introduction of innovations (Scherer, 1967 
and 1970; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980; Fisher and Temin, 1973; 
Link, 1980).  
 
The well-known Schumpeterian trade-off has been elaborated 
on these bases: the static inefficiencies, both in the allocation 
and production of resources, stemming by monopolistic or 
oligopolistic market structures can be compensated by the 
dynamic efficiency stemming from the faster rates introduction 
of innovations that large corporations can engender.  
 
Market structure and innovation 
 
The so-called Schumpeterian hypothesis recently received new 
attention in the context of the new growth theory. This new 
literature has investigated the relationship between competition 
and innovation with contrasting results. Aghion and Howitt 
(1992) at first confirmed the Schumpeterian hypothesis 
according to which there is a negative correlation between 
competition and innovation, as measured by the intensity of 
R&D efforts. Subsequently Aghion and Howitt (1999), 
however, changed their mind and elaborated the view that 
competition should push firms to innovate. Finally Aghion et al. 
(2004) elaborated a compromise, suggesting that an inverted U 
shaped relation between competition and R&D expenditures 
might apply. The original findings of Scherer (1967) and 
Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1980) were confirmed after a long 
debate. 
 
In this context, much attention has been paid to investigating the 
relations between competition and innovation, but very little 
analysis has been dedicated to the relation between profitability 
and innovation. While there is some obvious over-lapping 
between the two issues, there are many other factors at play.    8
 
On the one hand, the relevance of inter-industrial and 
international dynamics where demand cross-elasticities among a 
variety of products that are classified in an array of different 
industries that are based in many different countries reduces the 
correlation between the domestic market structures of given 
industries and the profitability of the firms. Moreover high 
profits can be engendered by the introduction of innovations 
even in competitive markets. Losses or profits below the 
average may be the result of mistakes and errors. More 
generally the variance of profits can be regarded as an indicator 
of the intensity of the selection process that wipes out firms that 
have not been able to select the correct combinations of 
quantities and prices.  
 
As soon as we abandon the hypothesis that firms are always able 
to spot the ‘correct’ combinations identified by stable equilibria 
and we accept the hypothesis that firms decision-making is 
based upon routines based upon trial and errors and rules-of-
thumb of different kinds, elaborated to operate in changing 
market conditions perturbed by continual (endogenous) 
alterations of both technologies and preferences, the relationship 
between market structure and profits become less and less 
consistent. 
 
Financial constraints and innovation 
 
It seems that the analysis of the relations between profits and 
innovation makes it possible to grasp some important aspects 
pertaining the provision of financial resources for innovation, 
and the problematic matching between scientific and 
technological knowledge and business competence, that are at 
the basis of an enlarged Schumpeterian hypothesis.  
 
An important aspect of the Schumpeterian analysis has been lost 
in the old and new debates about the so-called Schumpeterian 
hypothesis The key role attributed to Schumpeter to the   9
corporation as an innovative institution able to improving the 
relationship between finance, knowledge, competence and 
innovation has received much less attention than other facets of 
the Schumpeterian analysis (King and Levine, 1993).  
 
Yet Schumpeter is very clear in stressing the role of the 
corporation as a superior allocation and selection mechanism 
that reduces the inefficiency of financial markets in the 
provision of funds to innovative undertakings and increase the 
matching between competence and resources available to 
develop new technologies. Schumpeter regards the corporation 
as a hierarchical system that makes it possible the coordinated 
working of internal markets where financial resources matched 
with competence can be fueled towards risky but innovative 
undertakings (Schumpeter, 1942 and 1947).  
 
When perfect competition applies in product markets, financial 
markets perform very poorly in the allocation of resources for 
innovative activities. Severe credit rationing afflicts the working 
of financial markets for innovative projects. Financial 
institutions are reluctant to fund research and innovative 
activities conducted by incumbents and the eventual start-up of 
new innovative firms because of the radical uncertainty that 
characterize both the generation and the exploitation of 
innovations. Perspective lenders and investors are worried by 
the combined high levels of risk that stem from:  
a) the intrinsic ignorance of rational decision-makers with 
respect to the un-chartered fields that innovations might open. 
High levels of competence that are necessary to assess, evaluate 
and select the different potential technological innovations that 
are daily proposed by perspective entrepreneurs,  
b) the high mortality of new ventures. Experience teaches that 
large proportion of activities that have been funded with their 
own money will not succeed. Serendipity plays a key role in 
such matters: the actual delivery of successful innovations can 
be predicted only to a limited extent. Often innovations are   10
actually generated with great delays with respect to planning 
and apply to different fields with respect to expectations;  
c) the non-appropriability of knowledge. Innovations, 
occasionally generated, will be rarely appropriated by the 
inventor, especially if he enters a competitive market with low 
barriers to entry and to imitation. The chances that the stream of 
profits earned in a short lead-time makes it possible to repay the 
credits and remunerate the capital invested are low. Even in the 
case of a successful generation, lenders have good reasons to 
worry about dissipation stemming from uncontrolled leakages of 
proprietary knowledge. The rapid imitation by competitors, both 
incumbent and new entrants, risks to limit the time stretch 
during which innovators can command profits above the norm 
and hence the chances to capitalize on the innovations 
introduced. As a consequence worthy inventive activities and 
innovative projects are considered too risky by lenders and are 
sorted out in financial markets (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).  
 
Lenders bear the risks of failure both in the generation and 
exploitation of innovations, but cannot participate into the 
benefits of success. At best lenders can retrieve the funds that 
had been advanced augmented by an interest rate that 
incorporates a risk premium. Lenders however cannot take 
advantage of the flow of extra-profits that are generated by 
successful innovators. On the opposite, the provision of funds in 
the form of equity enables the full participation to the benefits of 
success. Equity finance can participate into the bottom tail of the 
highly skewed distribution of positive returns stemming from 
the introduction of new technologies (Hall, 2002).  
 
The new understanding about the asymmetry between debt and 
equity in the provision of funds for research activities elaborated 
by Stiglitz (1985) paves the way to a new appreciation of the 
role of the Schumpeterian corporation in fostering the rate of 
introduction of innovations. 
   11
A share of extra-profits earned by large incumbents with 
barriers to entry can be retained by the managers and invested in 
research and development activities finalized to the introduction 
of innovations. The present levels of dividends are reduced but 
the market value of the corporation is increased by the 
expectations of the future profits stemming from the 
introduction of innovations. Capital gains compensate for the 
decrease in the levels of dividends (Chandler 1962, 1977, 1990).  
 
Within the corporation the resources extracted by the extra-
profits match the competences of skilled managers and the 
vision of potential entrepreneurs. The Schumpeterian 
corporation can reduce the intrinsic failure of competitive 
markets in the allocation of resources to research, in the 
identification of the proper level of rewards and hence 
incentives to the introduction of innovations. The corporation is 
an effective institution able to substitute the financial markets in 
the provision and allocation of funds to innovative activities 
because it combines financial resources and learning with 
entrepreneurial vision within competent hierarchies, provided 
that extra-profits can be earned and a consistent share is directed 
towards the generation and introduction of innovations (Penrose 
1959. 
 
Here it is clear that the higher are the profits and the larger the 
opportunities to use a share to fund research activities and hence 
to increase the rates of introduction of new technologies. 
 
 
2.3. FAILURE-INDUCED TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 
 
The notion of innovation as a form of creative reaction is well 
grounded in the economics of innovation literature and can be 
traced back to Joseph Schumpeter (1947). The behavioural 
theory of the firm has provided solid foundations to this 
approach.   12
In the behavioural theory of the firm, innovation is an out-of-
equilibrium conduct that takes place when out-of-equilibrium 
conditions prevail. In equilibrium conditions firms are reluctant 
to innovate because of the intrinsic uncertainty that characterizes 
both the generation and exploitation of technological 
knowledge. Innovation is induced by the failure to reach the 
levels of performance that each firm has defined as satisfactory. 
 
According to James March (March and Simon, 1958; Cyert and 
March, 1963), firms are induced to the take the risks associated 
with the introduction of innovations when performances fall 
below some minimum levels that have been identified as a 
threshold. In this tradition of analysis, firms are not profit 
maximizers. Firms are able to rely upon procedural, as opposed 
to substantive, rationality: firms use satisfying procedures and 
identify satisfactory levels of performances. Firms are risk 
adverse and hence reluctant to change their routines, their 
production processes, their networks of suppliers, their products 
and their marketing activities. Firms can overcome their 
intrinsic inertia and resistance to change only when the actual 
levels of performance fall below some thresholds. At this time a 
failure-induced mechanism of change is set for and firms are 
more ready to take the risks associated with innovation (March 
and Shapira, 1987).3 
 
Behavioral analyses of the firm have provided a rich theoretical 
frame that makes it possible the reconciliation of theories of 
failure-induced change and threat-rigidity. This theory explicitly 
links the cognitive psychology that underlies the characteristics 
of risk-seeking behavior and the implications of threat-rigidity 
                                                 
3  As Nooteboom (2003: 225) notes “discovery is guided by motive, 
opportunity and means. One needs an accumulation of unsatisfactory 
performance to generate motive; to overcome one’s own inertia or that of 
others in organization. In markets, one also needs an opportunity of 
demand and/or technology. And one needs insights into what source and 
how to incorporate them in present competence”.  
   13
when facing the need to change the routines of organizations 
(March and Simon, 1958; March, 1988; Ocasio, 1998) 4.  
 
In order to re-establish the minimum levels of performance that 
are considered to be satisfying, firms activate new routines, 
search for new technologies already available, explore new 
possible technologies. Innovation is induced by failure (March, 
1991).   
 
The localized technological change approach elaborates this 
frame and shows how the mix of failure-inducement and 
opportunities that emerge in out-of-equilibrium conditions both 
in factor and product markets induce firms to change not only 
their techniques but also their technologies with the introduction 
of innovations (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1969; David, 1975; 
Antonelli, 1999 and 2008). 
 
 
3. Profitability and innovation: The hypothesis of a U-
shaped relationship 
  
The integration of the augmented induced technological change 
approach based upon the appreciation of new facets of the 
Marxian legacy with a revised version of the Schumpeterian 
tradition, and the failure-induced innovation hypothesis 
elaborated by the localized technological change approach 
provides the basic tools to analyze the relationship between 
profits above and below the norm, interpreted as indicators of 
out-of-equilibrium conditions, and innovation. 
 
Firms are pushed to innovate and hence to search for new 
products and processes by the combined effects of incentives 
and opportunities that emerge when out-of-equilibrium 
conditions prevail. The levels of profitability are a clear and 
                                                 
4 See Greve (1998) who examines how performance feedback affects the probability 
of risky organization. His empirical analysis in the radio broadcasting industry shows 
the consequences of shortfalls of performances on the probability of strategic change 
and their strong sensitivity to social and historical aspiration levels.    14
non-ambiguous indicator of the proximity to equilibrium 
conditions. While normal profits signal that the system is in 
equilibrium, both profits below and above the norm signal that 
the firm is away from equilibrium conditions. The larger is the 
variance of the levels of profitability and the stronger the 
conditions of out-of-equilibrium at the system level. The larger 
is the difference between the specific profit levels of each firm 
and the normal profitability and farther away are the local 
conditions from equilibrium. 
 
When the profits are below the norm and actually fetch negative 
values in absolute terms, firms understand that their survival is 
at stake. The low levels of profitability engender risks of 
survival that push firms to try and innovate. The intentional and 
explicit generation of new technological and organizational 
knowledge becomes necessary. To do so firms are induced 
towards an array of new routines such as the funding of research 
and development activities, the valorization of the tacit 
knowledge acquired by means of learning processes, the 
exploitation of external sources of new technological 
knowledge, the adoption and creative adaptations of new 
production processes and new products5.  
 
At the other extreme it is clear that high levels of profits provide 
firms with the opportunity to take advantage of the failure of 
competitive markets in the generation and exploitation of 
technological innovations. The resistance to change is much 
lower when organizations are performing and the abundance of 
resources makes it possible to identify the perspectives for new 
profitable ventures. Here change is intrinsically intertwined with 
growth and development, hence with new opportunities of 
upgrading for the members of the organization and for decision-
makers. Firms with high levels of profits are often characterized 
                                                 
5 Antonelli (1989 and 1990) has provided empirical evidence upon the role of failure 
inducement mechanisms in the processes of introduction and adoption of 
technological and organizational innovations in the Italian economy at the end of 80s, 
at a time when the economic performances of most firms where threatened by falling 
performances at the system level   15
by dynamic capabilities and flexible organizations that have 
already being able to generate new technological knowledge and 
to introduce technological innovations. High profits signal much 
more than monopolistic rents: they identify conditions of 
turbulence and out-if-equilibrium that firms are facing (March 
and Simon, 1958; Penrose, 1959). 
 
When profits are in the norm, firms have neither the incentives 
nor the opportunity to try and innovate. Internal resources to 
finance research and development and the eventual introduction 
of new prototypes are missing. At the same time inertia and 
resistance to change are not questioned, as managers do not feel 
the need to change the current state of their activities. The 
opportunity costs of risky undertakings whose failure might 
compromise the equilibrium of the company are very high. 
Product and factor markets should be close to condition of 
perfect competition: hence firms have little opportunities to 
exploit their innovations. Knowledge can hardly be appropriated 
and imitators can benefit of the knowledge generated by third 
parties. Credit rationing limits the access to financial resources 
that are necessary to generate new technological knowledge and 
to introduce technological innovations (Fazzari and Petersen, 
1993; Bloch, 2005). 
  
The causal relationship between profitability and innovation can 
be specified by a quadratic function: with low profits, below the 
average, including losses, firms have a strong incentive to 
innovate; with high profits above the norm, firms have 
important opportunities to fund research activities and hence 
innovate; firms with normal profits miss both incentives and 
opportunities.  The basic argument is that combination of 
incentives and opportunities provides the basic mix of 
determinants to innovate. In the first case a failure inducement 
mechanism is at work: firms are induced to try and change their 
technologies and their organization when profits fall below a 
minimum threshold and their survival is put at risk. In the 
second case, incentives are lower but the opportunities for firms   16
that enjoy extra-profits are strong. Firms can fund risky 
activities with a share of extra-profits and hence overcome the 
severe rationing of financial markets in the provision of 
resources for undertaking innovative activities. Firms with 
extra-profits moreover can guide internal markets by means of 
competent hierarchies so as to match financial resources, 
competence and innovative ideas. Firms with normal profits 
have both lesser incentives and opportunities to innovate. 
 
FIGURE 1.  
THE QUADRATIC RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 




The relationship between profit and innovation is shaped in 
Figure 1 where we set forth the basic hypothesis that the rates of 
innovation are higher the farther away firms are from 
equilibrium conditions. The grey regions identify the conditions 
of out-of-equibrium, as measured by the levels of profitability 
with respect to average values, where profitability is below and 
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With low profits, fetching negative values, firms have a strong 
failure-induced incentive to innovate. Their survival is at risk. 
All the resources need to be mobilized in order to change the 
current state of activities and introduce technological and 
organizational innovations that make it possible to increase their 
total factor productivity.  
 
Firms with profits in the average have no incentives and no 
opportunities to innovate. Rational decision-making inhibits the 
assumption of actions in domains that are characterized by 
radical uncertainty such as innovative undertakings, for the 
well-known problems of unpredictability both in their 
generation and exploitation.  
 
Finally when firms enjoy extra-profits, at levels that are above 
the normal profitability, managers have the opportunity to fund 
research and innovative activities with their own internal funds. 
After payments of hefty dividends, managers can retain 
sufficient funds to undertake innovative projects designed to 
stretch the duration of market power. Extra-profits provide the 
opportunity to fund innovative activities and signal the existence 
of barriers to entry that increase de-facto the chances of 
appropriability of the stream of benefits stemming from the 
introduction of successful innovations. 
 
 




In this section we introduce our empirical methodology to assess 
the relationship between firm level profitability and innovation, 
using an original dataset containing balance sheet accounting 
data for a sample of Italian Manufacturing companies.  
 
The dataset includes financial accounting data for a large sample 
of manufacturing companies, observed along years 1996-2005. 
The data have been extracted from the AIDA database provided   18
by Bureau Van Dick, which reports accounting information for 
public and private Italian firms with a turnover larger than 0.5 
millions of Euros. The companies included in the analysis have 
been founded before year 1995, they are registered in a 
manufacturing sector according to the Italian ATECO 
classification, and they are still active by the end of year 2005. 
The introduction of the latter condition implies that we do not 
consider market exit/entry.  
 
We have included all the companies with at least 15 employees 
at the end of fiscal year 1995. In order to drop outliers due to 
possible errors in the data source, we computed a set of financial 
ratios and yearly growth rates of employees, sales and fixed 
capital stock. After a manual checking we eventually dropped 
45 companies which showed unreasonable data. We ended up 
with a balanced panel of 7020 companies.  All financial data 
have been deflated according to a sectoral two-digit deflator 
using year 2000 basic prices. In annex 1 we report the sectoral 
composition of the dataset. 
 
 
4.2 MODELS AND RESULTS 
This section presents the different steps of the empirical 
analysis. The identification of the variables precedes the 
econometric test. 
 
The measure of innovativeness 
The rates of increase of productivity both computed as total 
factor productivity (TFP) and Tornquist productivity are good 
measure of the levels of innovativeness of the firms. This is 
especially true with respect to the Italian system where, although 
the levels of formalized R&D activities and patent are low, 
much innovation based upon informal research activities, tacit 
knowledge and learning, takes place. Hence we assume that the 
bottom line increase of efficiency at the firm level is the 
ultimate indicator of the wide array of interrelated effects of the 
introduction of changes in products, processes, markets, 
organization and inputs (Parisi, Schiantarelli, Sembenelli, 2006).    19
 
In order to account for the important role of all changes in the 
input mix, we have both computed firm level total factor 
productivity and a Tornquist productivity measure that includes 
as inputs also materials and services.  
 
The measure of total factor productivity 
 
In order to compute firm-level TFP we have firstly estimated a 
set of Cobb-Douglas production functions with constant returns 
to scale for each industry included in the sample, so to obtain 
the correct levels of output elasticity of labor and capital. After 
the assignment of each firm to an industry we have computed 
TFP for company i in year t according to the following 
expression: 
 





t i t i
t i
t i K L
Q
TFP           ( 2 )  
 
Where:  
t i Q ,   :deflated value added 
t i L ,   :average number of employees  
t i K ,   :fixed capital stock. 
Fixed capital stock has been computed using a perpetual 
inventory technique according to which the first year accounting 
data, i.e. year 1996 in our case, are used as actual replacement 
values. The subsequent yearly values of fixed capital are 
computed using a depreciation parameter δ , assumed equal to 
6.5%, and adding deflated yearly investments. The investment 
parameter ( , ,t i I ) has been computed as the yearly variation in net 
fixed capital in companies’ balance sheets plus yearly 
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In order to identify the parameter β  at industry level to compute 
equation 2, we have estimated for each industry the following 
equation: 
 






















     (3) 
 
We have used a fixed effect estimator (Blundell and Bond, 
2000; Olley and Pakes, 1996), where  i α  is a firm specific effect 
and  t α  is a time specific effect.  
 
The measures of profitability and size 
 
For each firm included in the sample we have computed a 
measure of size defined as the log of total assets and a measure 
of financial leverage defined as the ratio of total net debt to total 
assets. Companies’ profitability has been evaluated in terms of 
return on total assets (ROA), defined as the ratio of earnings 
before interest and taxes to total assets.  This measure of 
profitability should be relatively unaffected by changes in fiscal 
policies along the panel years. Since we assume that the 
elasticity of innovation, as captured by changes in total factor 
productivity, to changes in profitability is likely to take place 
after a time lag, we have averaged the levels of size, leverage 
and profitability over a two years time period and then 
computed the TFP growth rate over the two following years. 
Here below we report the definition of the variables and in the 
Table 1 we show their summary statistics. 
  
t i TFP, ∆   Growth rate of TFP between years t and t-2  
t i AvgROA ,  Average level of ROA in years t and t-1 
t i AvgSIZE ,   Average level of size in years t and t-1 
t i AvgLEV ,   Average level of leverage in years t and t-1 
 
Table 1 Summary statistics   21
Variable Mean  st.  dev. 
AvGROA 0.077  0.086 
AvgLEV 0.692  0.189 
AvgSIZE 14.294  1.344 
∆TFP  0.046 0.342 
 
The econometric test 
 
In order to test our hypothesis, we use the following 
specification in which the growth rate of TFP between year t-2 
and t is regressed against a set of covariates whose levels are 
averaged over the years t-2 and t-3. 
 
t i t i t i t i t i i t i AvgROA AvgROA AvgSIZE AvgLEV TFP , 2 ,
2
4 2 , 3 2 , 2 2 , 1 , ε β β β β α + + + + + = ∆ − − − −
 
We initially regress the growth rates of TFP against the lagged 
measures of profitability, specifically testing for a quadratic 
functional form. The size of the firm is also included as a 
control variable. The model is estimated with both a fixed effect 
estimator and with instrumental variables. In the second case, 
the set of instruments includes the one year lagged values of all 





Table 2 Testing the effects of lagged levels of profitability on 
TFP growth rate, Fixed effects and IV results.  
  Fixed Effects  IV Estimator 
Number of 
firms 7020    7020   
2 , − t i AvgROA   -2.547 (0.034)  -2.758  (0.041) 
2 ,
2
− t i AvgROA   4.656 (0.189)  5.034  (0.207) 
2 , − t i AvgSIZE   0.089 (0.004)  0.112  (0.006) 
Const   -1.133 (0.061)  -1.449  (0.100) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
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The results show that the lagged values of profitability are 
significantly related to the subsequent growth rates of total 
factor productivity according to a quadratic specification. 
Moreover, size turns to be positively related to subsequent total 
factor productivity growth rates.  
 
Controlling for leverage 
 
In order to control for the role of financial constraints and the 
structure of the capital, we expand our model introducing among 
covariates also the average level of leverage of the firms. The 
estimates in the following Table 2.a show how the level of 
financial leverage seems to exert a negative impact on the 
capability of the companies to introduce technological and 
organizational changes aiming at improving productivity levels. 
While the results of this model specification cannot be 
interpreted directly as evidence of the presence of financial 
constraints6, still they stress the non neutrality of the capital 
structure on the subsequent innovation effort. For a company 
characterized by a high level of debt it might be difficult to raise 
additional external resources or to divert internal cash flow to 
investments in innovation and technology.         
 
                                                 
6 Models on financial constraints typically analyses the dynamics of investment and cash flow testing 
the degree of substitutability between internal and external financial resources. See Scellato, (2007) and 
Crespi and Scellato (2007) for a review on this issue.    23
Table 2.a Testing the effects of lagged levels of profitability 
on TFP growth rate, accounting for leverage. Fixed effects 
and IV results. 
   Fixed Effects  IV Estimator 
2 , − t i AvgROA   -2.581 (0.035)  -2.822  (0.041) 
2 ,
2
− t i AvgROA   4.759 (0.190)  5.229  (0.207) 
2 , − t i AvgSIZE   0.087 (0.004)  0.104  (0.006) 
2 , − t i AvgLEV   -0.141 (0.023)  -0.279  (0.028) 
Const   -1.005 (0.064)  -1.137  (0.104) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis  
 
In general, the empirical evidence confirms the relevance of out 
of equilibrium profitability as a major driver of innovation 
efforts. Such inducement effect is clearly stronger for those 
companies experiencing a phase of contraction in profitability, 
or for companies with profitability above average level. Size 
exerts always a positive and significant effect. The U-shaped 
relationship between TFP growth rates and profitability shows a 
minimum level for values of ROA of around 30%, which 
represents for our sample a value significantly higher than 
average levels of profitability along the panel years (7.7%). 
 
Tornquist productivity and profitability 
 
In this section we apply a Tornquist index of total factor 
productivity. In this case we investigate to what extent the 
residual in productivity, after accounting for changes in capital, 
labor and intermediate input materials, can be explained by the 
quadratic specification of the past values of profitability and the 
by the size of firms. We move  from the following specification: 
 
t i t i t i t i t i t i t i LnL LnK LnM LnA LnY , 1 , 1 , , , , ε η α γ β δ + + + + + + = − −  
 
Where Y equals total gross output (sales plus changes in final 
goods inventories), K is the fixed capital stock of the company, 
L is number of employees, M is a Tornquist index of deflated 
materials and services used in production and A is a firm 
specific measure of the state of technology at time t. Capital and   24
labor levels are fixed according to their beginning of the period 
levels while we use period cost of materials and services. 
Moreover, the above equation includes firm specific, common 
and idiosyncratic stochastic shocks. Analogously to the previous 
section, we have used a perpetual inventory approach to 
compute yearly levels of fixed capital.   
 
According to our hypothesis, we expect that the rate of 
technological progress, as represented by variations along time 
of the parameter A, depends on the innovation effort of the 
companies which in turn is a quadratic function of the previous 
level of profitability. In order to limit the risk of edogeneity of 
the regressors  we have chosen to use four year lagged value of 
profitability7. This amount to state that, considering a two year 
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Under the assumption of constant return to scale, it is possible to 
substitute the latter equations into the previous formula, 



































We test the above equations in order to check whether, after 
accounting for changes in capital stock and input materials, the 
variations in the residual change in productivity are explained 
by the quadratic specification of the lagged values of 
profitability. The above equation is estimated using fixed 




                                                 
7 We have also tested a model in which we use two years lagged values of profitability, obtaining 
similar results.    25
Table 3 Tornquist productivity index: Testing the effects of 





























Ln   0.094 (0.008) 
4 , − t i ROA   -0.101 (0.012) 
4 ,
2
− t i ROA   0.131 (0.025) 
Const  0.002 (0.001) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
 
We have also implemented two augmented versions of the 
previous model in which we also include size and leverage as 
explanatory variables of the changes in the parameter A. Also 
the new covariates enter the model at t-4. Results are reported in 
Table 4 and 4a.  
 
Table 4 Tornquist productivity index: Testing the effects of 


































4 , − t i ROA   -0.088 (0.012) 
4 ,
2
− t i ROA   0.113 (0.025) 
4 , − t i SIZE   0.005 (0.001) 
Const  -0.079 (0.018) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
 
 
   26
Table 4a Tornquist productivity index: testing the effects of 


































4 , − t i ROA   -0.103 (0.012) 
4 ,
2
− t i ROA   0.133 (0.026) 
4 , − t i SIZE   0.005 (0.001) 
4 , − t i LEV   -0.058 (0.009) 
Const  -0.035 (0.020) 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis 
 
The estimates shown in the two previous tables confirm the 
evidence obtained in the previous test where the measure of 
innovativeness was based upon TFP growth rates. In particular, 
the quadratic specification of the past level of profitability does 
exert a significant effect on subsequent changes in productivity 
even after accounting for the specific dynamics of intermediate 
production inputs. The evidence confirms that while firms with 
average profitability exhibit low levels of innovativeness, both 
firms with low levels of profitability, below the average and 
high levels of profitability, above the average, are much more 




The empirical evidence provided by the rich data set of a large 
data set of Italian firms for the years 1996-2005 confirms that 
the relationship between profitability and the rates of growth of 
both total factor and Tornquist productivity is U shaped.  
 
The introduction of innovations takes place in out-of-
equilibrium conditions and engenders out-of-equilibrium   27
conditions. Firms with normal levels of profitability are less 
ready to change their technologies and their organization. Firms 
with profitability below the average are induce to change their 
technologies and their organization because the current 
performances are below expectations, survival is at risk: 
innovation is induced. Innovation is necessary in order to 
contrast the deterioration of performances. Firms with 
profitability above the average have the opportunity to commit 
resources to risky activities. High levels of profitability make 
available financial resources that can be matched within internal 
markets with managerial competence and screening capabilities. 
Firms can satisfy the expectations of shareholders with the 
payment of dividends and invest the surplus in the search for 
new technologies, new markets, new products and processes that 
may lead to enhanced rates of growth. The future increase of the 
value of the company will eventually benefit shareholders in 
terms of capital gains.  
 
Firms with profits above the average can better hold the risks 
associated with innovative undertakings. Firms with profits 
below the average are already at risk: innovation is the extreme 
remedy that firms try and activate in order to reduce risks. In 
both cases firms in out-of-equilibrium conditions are keener to 
introduce innovations than firms close to equilibrium conditions. 
Firms in equilibrium conditions have lower levels of incentives 
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ANNEX 1 
 
Sectoral composition of the sample 
 
Industry – ATECO Classification 
Number of 
companies Percentage 
Food and beverages 561  8.0% 
Textile 607  8.6% 
Textile product industry  212  3.0% 
Leather and leather products manufacturing  249  3.5% 
Wood and wood products manufacturing  155  2.2% 
Pulp, paper and paper products manufacturing  174  2.5% 
Printing 193  2.7% 
Chemical industry  401  5.7% 
Plastics and rubber manufacturing  421  6.0% 
Non-metallic mineral product manufacturing  390  5.6% 
Metallurgy 275  3.9% 
Metal products manufacturing  983  14.0% 
Mechanical machinery and equipment manufacturing  1,078  15.4% 
Computer and electronic manufacturing  24  0.3% 
Electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing  287  4.1% 
Telecommunication machinery and equipment   91  1.3% 
Medical, optical and precision equipment  143  2.0% 
Transportation equipment manufacturing  122  1.7% 
Other transport equipment manufacturing  61  0.9% 
Furniture 487  6.9% 
Software 106  1.5% 
Total 7,020  100.0% 
 
 
 
 